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In this paper, we first obtain some fixed point theorems in locally convex
topological vector spaces which in turn imply some existence theorems of maximal
elements for C-condensing correspondences. Then by employing approximation
methods, we prove some existence theorems of equilibria for generalized games in
which the constraint correspondences are C-condensing and lower or upper
semicontinuous instead of having open lower sections or open graphs in infinite
dimensional locally convex topological vector spaces. Finally, an existence theorem
for the N-person game is also given. In particular, the corresponding results in the
literature have been improved. Q 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
1. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we first obtain some fixed point theorems in locally convex
topological vector spaces which in turn imply some existence theorems of
maximal elements for C-condensing correspondences which are either
upper semicontinuous or L -majorized. Then some existence theorems ofC
equilibria for generalized games are also given for C-condensing corre-
spondences. By employing approximation methods, we also prove some
existence theorems of equilibria for generalized games in which the
constraint correspondences are C-condensing and lower or upper semi-
continuous instead of having open lower sections in infinite dimensional
locally convex topological vector spaces. Finally, an existence theorem for
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the N-person game is also given with condensing mappings. These results
generalize or improve corresponding results in the literature. In particular,
w xthe question raised by Yannelis and Prabhakar 36 is answered in the
affirmative with weaker assumptions.
Now we introduce some notions and definitions. Throughout this paper,
all topological vector spaces are assumed to be Hausdorff. Let E be a
vector space and A ; E. We shall denote by co A the convex hull of A. If
A is a subset of a topological space X, the interior of A in X is denoted
by int A and the closure of A in X is denoted by cl A or simply int A,X X
and cl A if there is no ambiguity, respectively. Let X be a set; we shall
X  .denote by 2 the family of all subsets of X and F X the family of all
non-empty finite subsets of X. Let X and Y be sets and F, G: X ª 2Y be
a set-valued mapping. Then the mapping F l G: X ª 2Y is defined by
 . .  .  .F l G x s F x l G x for each x g X. Suppose X and Y are topo-
Y  .  .logical spaces and F: X ª 2 , then 1 F is said to be lower resp., upper
 .semicontinuous if for any closed resp., open subset U of Y, the set
  . 4  .  . x g X : F x ; U is closed resp. open in X ; 2 F has open resp.,
. y1 .   .4compactly open lower sections if F y :s x g X : y g F x is open in
 .X resp., open in each non-empty compact subset of X for each y g Y
 .  .and 3 a point x g X is said to be a maximal element of F if F x s B.
If X and Y are topological spaces and T : X ª 2Y is a correspondence,
 .  .4the graph of T , denoted by Graph T , is the set x, y g X = Y: y g T x
Y  .   .and the correspondence T : X ª 2 is defined by T x s y g Y: x, y g
4 cl Graph T the set cl Graph T is called the adherence of theX=Y X=Y
. Y  .   ..graph of T , and cl T : X ª 2 is defined by cl T x s cl T x for eachX
 .  .x g X. It is easy to see that cl T x ; T x for each x g X.
Let X and Y be topological spaces. A correspondence T : X ª 2Y is
 .  .  .  .said to be 1 quasi-regular if a it has open lower sections, b T x is
 .  .  .non-empty and convex for each x g X, and c T x s cl T x for eachX
 . Yx g X ; 2 the correspondence T : X ª 2 is said to be regular if it is
quasi-regular and has an open graph.
If X is a set, Y is a subset of a vector space, and F: X ª 2Y is such that
 . Yfor each x g X, co F x ; Y, then the mapping co F: X ª 2 is defined
 . .  .  4  4by co F x s co F x for each x g X. If X : i g I and Y : i g I arei i
collections of sets and F :  X ª 2Yi is a set-valued mapping for eachi jg I j
i g I, then the mapping  F :  X ª 2 i g I Yi is defined byig I i ig I i
 . .  . F x s  F x for each x g  X . We note that if X is aig I i ig I i ig I i
topological space, Y is a topological vector space, and F: X ª 2Y is lower
 wsemicontinuous, it is clear that co F is lower semicontinuous e.g., see 21,
x.Proposition 2.6 .
w xWe also recall some notation used in 34 . Let X be a non-empty set, Y
a non-empty subset of topological vector space E, and F: X ª 2Y a
 .set-valued mapping. A family f of correspondences between X andj jg J
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Y, index by a non-empty filtering set J we denote by `F ' the order
.relation in J is an upper approximating family for F if:
 .  .  .A F x ; f x for all x g X and all j g J;I j
 .A for each j g J there is j* g J such that for each h G j* andII
 .  .h g J, f x ; f x for each x g X ;h j
 .A for each x g X and V g B, where B is the fundamentalIII
system of zero of the topological vector space E, there is j g J such thatx, ¨
 .  .f x ; F x q V if h g J and j F h.h x, V
 .  .From A ] A , it is easy to deduce thatI III
 .A for each x g X and k g J,I V
F x ; f x s f x ; F x ; F x . .  .  .  .  .F Fj j
jgJ kFj , kgJ
Let X be a topological space, Y a non-empty subset of a vector space E,
u : X ª E be a single-valued mapping, and f : X ª 2Y be a correspon-
 .  .dence. Then 1 f is said to be of class L if a for each x g X,u , C
 .  .  .  . y1 .co f x ; Y and u x f co f x , and b for each y g Y, f y is
 .  .compactly open in X ; 2 f , N is an L -majorant of f at x if f :x x u , C x
Y  .X ª 2 and N is an open neighborhood of x in X such that a for eachx
 .  .  .  .  .  .z g N , f z ; f z and u z f co f z , b for each z g X, co f z ;x x x x
 . y1 .  .Y, and c for each y g Y, f y is compactly open in X ; 3 f is said tox
 .be L -majorized if for each x g X with f x / B, there exists anu , C
 .L -majorant f , N of f at x.u , C x x
It is clear that every correspondence of class L is L -majorized. Weu , C u , C
note that our notions of the correspondence f being of class L andu , C
L -majorized correspondence generalize the notions of correspondenceu , C
of class L U and L U-majorized correspondence, respectively, introducedu u
w x  .by Ding et al. in 9 which in turn generalize the notions of f g C X, Y, u
and C-majorized correspondence, respectively, introduced by Tulcea in
w x  .33 . In this paper, we shall deal mainly with either the case I X s Y and
is a non-empty convex subset of the topological vector space E and
 .u s I , the identity mapping on X ; or the case II X s  X andX ig I i
u s p : X ª X is the jth projection of X onto X and Y s X is aj j j j
 .non-empty convex subset of a topological vector space. In both cases I
 .and II , we shall write L in place of L .C u , C
 .Let I be a possibly uncountable or countable infinite set of players.
For each i g I, let its choice or strategy set X be a non-empty subset of ai
topological vector space. Let X s  X . For each i g I, let P : X ª 2 X iig I i i
w xbe a correspondence. Following the notion of Gale and Mas-Colell in 15 ,
 .the collection G s X , P will be called a qualitative game. A pointi i ig I
 .x g X is said to be an equilibrium of the game G if P x s B for all i g I.Ã Ãi
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For each i g I, let A be a subset of X . Then for each fixed k g I, wei i
  .define  A m A s x s x : x g A for all i g I with i / jjg I, j/ k j k i ig I i i
4and x g A .k k
 .A generalized game abstract economy is a family of quadruples G s
 .  .  .X ; A , B ; P where I is a finite or infinite set of players agentsi i i i ig I
such that for each i g I, X is a non-empty subset of a topological vectori
space and A , B : X s  X ª 2 X i are constraint correspondencesi i jg I j
X i  4and P : X ª 2 is a preference correspondence. When I s 1, . . . , Ni
 .where N is a positive integer, G s X ; A , B ; P is also called ani i i i ig I
N-person game. An equilibrium of G is a point x g X such that for eachÃ
 .  .  .  .i g I, x s p x g B x and A x l P x s B. We remark that whenÃ Ã Ã Ã Ãi i i i i
 .  . B x s cl B x which is the case when B has a closed graph inÃ Ãi X i ii
X = X ; in particular, when cl B is upper semicontinuous with closedi i
.values , our definition of an equilibrium point coincides with that of Ding
w xet al. 9 ; and if in addition, A s B for each i g I, our definition of ani i
equilibrium point coincides with the standard definition; e.g., see Borglin
w x w x w xand Keiding 3 , Tulcea 33 , and Yannelis and Prabhakar 36 .
Throughout this paper, C denotes a lattice with a least element 0.
Let X be a Hausdorff locally convex topological vector space. Then
 w x. Xe.g., see Fitzpatrick and Petryshyn 11 a mapping C: 2 ª C is called a
measure of noncompactness provided that the following conditions hold
for any A, B g 2 X:
 .  .1 C A s 0 if and only if A is precompact.
 .  .  .2 C co A s C A , where co A denotes the closed convex hull of
A.
 .  .   .  .43 C A j B s max C A , C B .
 .  .  .It follows from 3 that if A ; B, then C A F C B . The above notion
w xis a generalization of the set-measure of noncompactness 18 and the
w xball-measure of noncompactness 25 defined either in terms of a family of
seminorms when X is a locally convex topological vector space or of a
single norm when X is a Banach space. For more details we refer the
w xreaders to reference 11 .
Let C: 2 X ª C be a measure of noncompactness of X and D ; X.
A mapping T : D ª 2 X is called C-condensing provided that if V ; D and
  ..  .C T V G C V , then V is relatively compact.
X   . .Note that if T : D ª 2 is a compact mapping i.e., T D is precompact ,
then T is C-condensing for any measure of noncompactness C. Various
C-condensing mappings which are not compact have been considered in
w x4, 16, 22]25 , etc. Moreover, when the measure of noncompactness C is
either the set-measure of noncompactness or ball-measure of noncompact-
ness, C-condensing mappings are called condensing mappings e.g., see
w x .16, 20, 22 , etc. .
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2. FIXED POINT THEOREMS
In this section, some fixed point theorems are derived for C-condensing
mappings.
w xWe first need the following result which is Lemma 2.1 of 20 ; for
completeness, we include its proof:
LEMMA 2.1. Let D be a non-empty closed con¨ex subset of a locally
con¨ex topological ¨ector space E and T : D ª 2 D be C-condensing, where
C: 2 E ª C is a measure of noncompactness. Then there exists a non-empty
compact and con¨ex subset K of X such that T : K ª 2 K.
Proof. Let x be an element of D and consider the family F of all0
closed convex subsets C of D such that x g C and T : C ª 2C. Clearly, F0
is non-empty. Let C s F C. Then C is a non-empty closed and0 C g F 0
 . C0convex and x g C . If x g C , T x ; C for all C so that T : C ª 2 .0 0 0 0
Now we prove that C is a non-empty compact convex subset of D.0
Suppose that C were not compact. Then since T is C-condensing map-0
  ..  .  4  ..ping, C T C h C C . Let C s co x j T C . Then C ; C , which0 0 1 0 0 1 0
 .  .impies that T C ; T C ; C . Hence, C g F and C ; C . Therefore1 0 1 1 0 1
 . w  4  ..xC s C , a contradiction because C C s C co x j T C s0 1 1 0 0
  ..C T C where the second equality holds because of definition of C. This0
contradiction proves the Lemma 2.1.
By Lemma 2.1 we have the following fixed point theorem in locally
convex topological vector spaces.
THEOREM 2.2. Let D be a non-empty closed and con¨ex subset of a
locally con¨ex topological ¨ector space E. Suppose that T : D ª 2 D is a
multi¨ alued mapping such that the following conditions are satisfied:
 .  .1 the mapping T is C-condensing and T x is non-empty con¨ex for
each x g D, where C: 2 E ª C is a measure of non-compactness;
 . y1 .   .42 for each y g D, the set T y s x g D: y g T x is compactly
open in D. Then T has a fixed point in D.
Proof. Since T is C-condensing, by Lemma 2.1, there exists a non-empty
compact convex subset K of D such that T : K ª 2 K. For each y g K,
y1 .  .T y is also open in K by 2 . Since K is compact, there exists a finite
 .subset H of K and a continuous single-valued mapping f : K ª co H
 .  . wsuch that f x g T x for each x g K by Proposition 1 of Browder 5, p.
x  . <69 . Then the restriction of f to co H , i.e., the mapping f is acoH .
 .  .  .self-mapping from co H to co H . Since co H is a closed and convex
subset of a finite dimensional space, by well-known Brouwer fixed point
 .  .  .theorem, there exists x g co H ; K ; D such that x s f x g T x .
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Theorem 2.2 generalizes most well known fixed point theorems in locally
w x w xconvex topological vector spaces given in 10 , see also Tian in 31 .
3. MAXIMAL ELEMENTS THEOREMS
As applications to our Theorem 2.2 and Theorem 2.3, we have the
following existence theorems of maximal elements.
THEOREM 3.1. Let D be a non-empty closed and con¨ex subset of a
locally con¨ex topological ¨ector space E. Suppose that T : D ª 2 D is a
multi¨ alued mapping such that the following conditions are satisfied:
 .  .1 the mapping T is C-condensing and T x is con¨ex for each x g D,
where C: 2 E ª C is a measure of noncompactness;
 . y1 .   .42 for each y g D, the set T y s x g D: y g T x is compactly
open in D;
 .  .3 for each x g D, x f T x .
 .Then T has a maximal element, i.e., there exists x g D such that T x s B.
Proof. Assuming that the conclusion is not true, we will get a contra-
 .diction. In fact, if T x is not empty for each x g D, then T satisfies all
conditions of Theorem 2.2. By Theorem 2.2, there exists x g D such that
 .  .x g T x which contradicts the condition 3 .
Before we prove the existence theorems of maximal elements for corre-
spondences which are L -majorized, we recall the following result which isC
w xLemma 2 of Ding and Tan 8 :
LEMMA 3.2. Let X be a paracompact topological space and Y a subset of a
Y  4¨ector space E. Let u : X ª E and P: X ª 2 _ B be L -majorized.u , C
Y  4Then there exists a correspondence f : X ª 2 _ B of class L such thatu , C
 .  .P x ; f x for all x g X.
By Lemma 3.2 and Theorem 2.2, we now have:
THEOREM 3.3. Let X be a non-empty closed and con¨ex subset of a
topological ¨ector space E and Q: X ª 2 X be of class L . Suppose that QI , CX
is also C-condensing, where C: 2 E ª C is a measure of noncompactness.
 .Then there exists a point x g X such that Q x s B.
 .Proof. If the conclusion were false, then for each x g X, Q x is
non-empty. Since Q is also C-condensing, by Lemma 2.1, there exists a
non-empty compact convex subset K of X such that Q: K ª 2 K is such
 .that for each x g K, Q x / B. Now by Theorem 2.2, there exists a point
 .x g X such that x g co Q x which contradicts that Q is of class L .I , CX
Therefore the conclusion must hold.
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THEOREM 3.4. Let X be a non-empty closed and con¨ex subset of a locally
con¨ex topological ¨ector space and P: X ª 2 X be L -majorized. SupposeI , CX
that P is also C-condensing, where C: 2 E ª C is a measure of noncompact-
ness. Then P has a maximal element, i.e., there exists x g X such that
 .P x s B.
 .Proof. Suppose that the conclusion does not hold. Then P x / B for
all x g X and since P is C-condensing, there exists a non-empty compact
convex subset K of X such that P: K ª 2 K by Lemma 2.1. Since P is
L -majorized, so that the restriction of P to K is also L -majorized.I , C I , CX X
 .   . 4For each x g K, P x / B, the set x g K : P x / B s K is compact
which in turn is paracompact. By Lemma 3.2, there exists a correspon-
K  .  .dence f: K ª 2 of class L such that for each x g X, P x ; f x .I , CX
 .By Theorem 3.3, there exists an x g K such that f x s B so that
 .P x s B which is a contradiction. Therefore, there exists x g X, such
 .that P x s B.
w xTheorem 3.4 generalizes Corollary 1 of Borglin and Keiding 3 , Theo-
w x w xrem 2.2 of Toussaint 32 , Theorem 2 of Tulcea 33 , and Corollary 5.1 of
w xYannelis and Prabhakar 36 .
4. EQUILIBRIA IN LOCALLY CONVEX TOPOLOGICAL
VECTOR SPACES
w xIn this section, by approximation methods inspired by Chang 6 and
w x  w x.Tulcea 34 see also 35 , we first give the existence theorems of equilibria
of generalized games in which the constraint correspondences are lower
semicontinuous instead of having open lower sections or open graphs in
infinite dimensional locally convex topological vector spaces. Then the
existence theorems of equilibria of generalized games in which the con-
straint correspondences are upper semicontinuous and preferences are
lower semicontinuous are also given.
In order to get our result, we need the following result which is Lemma
w x5.3 in 27 :
LEMMA 4.1. Let X be a topological space, Y be a non-empty subset of a
topological ¨ector space E, B be a base for the zero neighborhoods in E, and
Y Y  .   .B: X ª 2 . For each V g B, let B : X ª 2 be defined by B x s B xV V
.q V l Y for each x g X. If x g X and y g Y are such that y gÃ Ã Ã
 .  .F B x , then y g B x .Ã Ã ÃV g B V
We also need the following existence theorem of equilibria for qualita-
tive games.
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 .THEOREM 4.2. Let G s X , P be a qualitati¨ e game such thati i ig I
X s  X . Suppose the following conditions are satisfied:ig I i
 .a X is a non-empty compact and con¨ex subset of a topologicali
¨ector space for each i g I;
 . X ib P : X ª 2 is L -majorized for each i g I;i C
 .   . 4   . 4c D x g X : P x / B s D int x g X : P x / B .ig I i ig I X i
Then G has an equilibrium point in X.
Proof. For each i g I, X is a non-empty compact and convex subset ofi
w xthe topological vector space E . By Theorem 3 of Ding and Tan 8 , therei
 .exists a point x g X such that P x s B for all i g I.i
Now as the applications of Lemma 4.1 and Theorem 4.2, we shall use
w x w xthe approximation technique inspired by Chang 6 and Tulcea 34 to
obtain equilibrium existence theorems for generalized games in which the
constraint correspondences are lower semicontinuous instead of having
lower open sections. The outline of ideas is as follows: for given a
 .generalized game G s X ; A , B ; P , we first construct an associatedi i i i ig I
  .  .  . .approximate generalized game G s X ; A , B ; P for eachV i V i V i V i ig I
non-empty open neighborhood V of zero in locally convex topological
vector space. Then, for the associated approximate generalized game
  .  .  . .G s X ; A , B ; P , there exists an associated simple quali-V i V i V i V i ig I
  . .tative game T s X ; Q which exhibits the same equilibriumV i V i ig I
  .  .points as the approximate generalized game G s X ; A , B ;V i V i V i
 . .P by Theorem 4.2. Finally by employing our approximate LemmaV i ig I
4.1 and finite intersection property, the result is deduced.
 .THEOREM 4.3. Let G s X ; A , B ; P be a generalized game andi i i i ig I
X s  X . Suppose the following conditions are satisfied:ig I i
 .a for each i g I, X is a non-empty compact and con¨ex subset of ai
locally con¨ex Hausdorff topological ¨ector space E ;i
 . X ib for each i g I, A : X ª 2 is lower semicontinuous such that fori
 .  .  .each x g X, A x is non-empty and co A x ; B x ;i i i
 .c for each i g I, A l P is L -majorized;i i C
 . i   . . 4d for each i g I, the set E s x g X : A l P x / B is openi i
in X.
 .Then G has an equilibrium point in X, i.e., there exists a point x s x g XÃ Ãi ig I
 .  .  .such that for each i g I, x g B x and A x l P x s B.Ã Ã Ã Ãi i i i
Proof. Let V s  V be given where for each i g I, V is an openig I i i
convex neighborhood of zero in E . Fix any i g I and define A , B :i V Vi i
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X i  .   . .  .   . .X ª 2 by A x s co A x q V l X and B x s B x q V lV i i i V i ii i
 .X for each x g X. By a , A is lower semicontinuous so that co A is alsoi i i
w xlower semicontinuous by Proposition 2.6 of 21, p. 366 , it follows from
w x w xLemma 4.1 of 6, p. 244 or from 33, p. 7 that A has an open graph inVi
  .4X = X. Now let F s x g X : x f B x . Then F is open in X.V i V Vi i i
Define the mapping Q : X ª 2 X i byVi
A l P x , if x f F , .  .i i ViQ x s .Vi  A x , if x g F . .i Vi
 .We shall prove that the qualitative game T s X , Q satisfies alli V ig Ii
conditions of Theorem 4.2. First we note that for each i g I, the set
x g X : Q x / B . 4Vi
s F l x g X : A x / B j x g X _ F : A x l P x / B 4 .  .  . 4V i V i ii i
s F j x g X _ F : A x l P x / B by b .  .  . . 4V V i ii i
s F j X _ F l Ei s F j Ei . .V V Vi i i
 .  .is open in X by d . Let x g X be such that Q x / B. We consider theVi
following two cases:
Case 1. x g F . Letc s A and N s F . Then N is an open neigh-V x V x V xi i i
 .  .  .  .  .borhood of x in X such that i Q z ; c z and by b , z f co c zV x i xi
 .  .  .  .for each z g N ; ii co c z ; X for each z g X by b ; and iiix x i
y1 . y1 .c y s A y is open in X for all y g X since A has an openx V i Vi i
graph. Therefore, c is an L -majorant of Q at x.x C Vi
 .  . .Case 2. x f F . Since Q x s A l P x / B and A l P is L -V V i i i i Ci i
majorized, there exist an open neighborhood N of x in X and ax
X i  .  . .  .correspondence f : X ª 2 such that i A l P z ; f z and z fx i i x i
 .  .  .  .co f z for each z g N ; ii co f z ; X for each z g X ; and iiix x x i
y1 . X if y is compactly open in X for each y g X . Define c : X ª 2 byx i x
A z l f z , if z f F , .  .V x Vi i
c z s .x  A z , if z g F . .V Vi i
 . .  .  .  .Note that as A l P z ; f z and A z ; A z for each z g N , wei i x i V xi
 .  .  .  .have Q z ; c z and co c z ; X . It is easy to see that z f co c zV x x i i xi
YUAN AND TARAFDAR22
for all z g X. Moreover, for any y g X , the seti
cy1 y s z g X : y g c z 4 .  .x x
s z g X _ F : y g c z j z g F : y g c z .  . 4  4V x V xi i
s z g X _ F : y g A z l f z j z g F : y g A z .  .  . 4  4V V x V Vi i i i
y1 y1 y1s X _ F l A y l f y j F l A y .  .  . .V V x V Vi i i i
y1 y1s f y j F l A y .  .x V Vi i
is compactly open in X. Therefore, c is an L -majorant of Q at pointx C Vi
x.
Hence Q is an L -majorized correspondence. Now by our assumption,V Ci
  . 4   . . 4the set x g X : Q x / B s F j x g X _ F : A l P x / B sV V V i ii i ii  .F j E is open in X by condition c . Therefore all hypotheses ofVi
Theorem 4.2 are satisfied, so that by Theorem 4.2, there exists a point
 .  .x s x g X such that Q x s B for all i g I. Since for eachV V ig I V Vi i
 .  .  .i g I, A x is non-empty, we must have x g B x and A x li V V V i Vi i
 .P x s B.i V
For each i g I, let B be the collection of all open convex neighbor-i
hoods of zero in E and B s  B . Given any V g B, let V s  V ,i ig I i jg I j
where V g B for each j g I. By the argument above, there exists aj j
 .  .  .x g X such that x g B x and A x l P x s B for each i g I,Ã Ã Ã Ã ÃV V V V i V i Vi i
 .   . .where B x s B x q V l X for each x g X. It follows that the setV i i ii
  .  .  . 4Q [ x g K : x g B x and A x l P x s B is a non-empty andV i V i ii
 .closed subset of X by d .
 4Now we want to prove Q has the finite intersect property. LetV V g B
 4V , . . . , V be any finite subset of B. For each i s 1, . . . , n, let V s1 n i
 n . V where V g B for each j g I; let V s  F V , thenjg I i j i j i jg I is1 i j
Q / B. Clearly Q ; Fn Q so that Fn Q / B. Therefore theV V is1 V is1 Vi i
 4family Q : V g B has the finite intersect property. Since X is compact,V
F Q / B. Now take any x g F Q , then for each i g I, xÃ ÃV g B V V g B V i
 .  .  .g B x for each V g B and A x l P x s B. By Lemma 4.1, weÃ Ã ÃV i i i ii
 .must have for each i g I, x g B x .Ã Ãi i
As a consequence of Theorem 4.3, we have the following:
 .COROLLARY 4.4. Let G s X , A , B , P be a generalized game suchi i i i ig I
that X s  X is paracompact. Suppose the following conditions areig I i
satisfied:
 .a for each i g I, X is a non-empty compact and con¨ex subset of ai
locally con¨ex Hausdorff topological ¨ector space E ;i
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 .  .b for each i g I and for each x g X, A x is non-empty andi
 .  .co A x ; B x ;i i
 . c for each i g I, A has an open graph in X = X resp., is loweri i
. semicontinuous and P is lower semicontinuous resp., has an open graph ini
.X = X ;i
 .d for each i g I, A l P is L -majorized.i i C
Then G has an equilibrium point in X, i.e., there exists point x g X such thatÃ
 .  .  .for each i g I, x g B x and A x l P x s B.Ã Ã Ã Ãi i i i
Proof. For each i g I, since A has an open graph in X = X resp., isi i
. lower semicontinuous and P is lower semicontinuous resp., has openi
. X igraph in X = X , the mapping A l P : X ª 2 is also lower semicon-i i i
w x i tinuous by Lemma 4.2 of 36, p. 103 , so that the set E s x g X :
 .  . 4A x l P x / B is open in X. Therefore all conditions of Theorem 4.3i i
are satisfied and the conclusion follows.
wNow, by Theorem 4.3 and the approximation Theorem 3 of Tulcea 34,
xp. 280 , we are able to give the existence theorem of the generalized game
 .G s X ; A ; P in which the constraint correspondences are upperi i i ig I
semicontinuous and preferences are lower semicontinuous instead of hav-
ing open lower sections or open graphs.
 .THEOREM 4.5. Let G s X , A , P be a generalized game and X si i i ig I
 X . Suppose the following conditions are satisfied for each i g I:ig I i
 .a X is a non-empty compact and con¨ex subset of a locally con¨exi
topological ¨ector space E ;i
 . X ib A : X ª 2 is upper semicontinuous with non-empty closed andi
con¨ex ¨alues;
 . X ic P : X ª 2 is lower semicontinuous and L -majorized;i C
 . i   . . 4d for each i g I, E s x g X ; A l P x / B is open in X.i i
 .  .Then there exists x g X such that for each i g I, A x l P x s B andi i
 .x g A x .i i
Proof. For each i g I, X is non-empty compact and convex, so thati
X s  X is also compact and convex. Given any i g I, since A isig I i i
w xupper semicontinuous, Theorem 3 of Tulcea 34, p. 280 implies that there
 .exists a family B indeed by a filtering set J, consisting of regulari j jg J
 .  .correspondences between X and X , such that both B and Bi i j jg J i j jg J
are upper approximating of families for B .i
  .  . .The game G s X ; B , B ; P satisfies the hypotheses of Theo-j i i j i i j i i ig I
 .rem 4.3 hence also Corollary 4.4 for each j g J. Hence G has anj
j*  j*.  j*.equilibrium x g X for each fixed j g J such that B x l P x s B,i j i
j* j* .  .and p x g B x for an i g 1.i i j
YUAN AND TARAFDAR24
Let U be an ultrafilter on J finer than the filter sections of J. Since
j* j* j* .  .  .x ; X, let x s lim x . Then for all i g I, p x s lim x .jg J j, U i j, U i
 .  .For each i g I, we know that A x ; B x for all x g X and j g J.i i j
 j*.  j*.  .Since for each j g J, A x l P x s B for all i g I. By condition d ,i i
 .  .it implies that A x l P x s B for all i g I.i i
For each j g J, x j* is an equilibrium point of the generalized game Gj
j* j* j* j* .  .  .   ..and B is regular. Therefore cl B x s B x and x g cl B xi j i j i j i i j
j* .   . .s B x . Since B has a closed graph, x, x g Graph B for everyi j i j i i j
 .i g I. But for each i g I, B is the upper approximating family of thei j jg J
 .correspondence A , by the property A of the upper approximatingi I V
 .  .family, for each x g X, F B x ; A x . We also know that A has ajg J i j i i
 .  .  .closed graph by b , so that for each i g I, A x l P x s B andi i
 .  .p x g A x .i i
w xWe note that Theorem 4.5 generalizes Theorem 5 of Tulcea 34, p. 284
to the extent that the preference correspondence P is L -majorizedi C
instead of E -majorized. Theorem 4.5 also generalizes the Theorem ofi
w xShafer and Sonnenschein 26, p. 374 and a corresponding result due to
w xTian in 30 .
i The following example shows that the ``for each i g I, the set E s x
 . . 4  .g X : A l P x / B is open in X '' in condition d of Theorem 4.5 isi i
essential.
 4 w x XEXAMPLE. Let I s 1 and X s 0, 1 . Define A, P: X ª 2 by
¡w x w1r2, 1 , if x g 0, 1r2 ,.
~w x0, 1 , if x s 1r2,A x s . ¢w x0, 1r2 , if x g 1r2, 1 ,
and
B, if x s 0,
P x s .  w0, x , if x g 0, 1 ..
Then A is upper semicontinuous with non-empty closed convex values and
 4the fixed point set of A is a singleton 1r2 . The correspondence P has
w x y1 .convex values with open lower sections since for each y g 0, 1 , P y s
 xy, 1 is open in X. Therefore A, P, and X satisfy all conditions except
 w x  .  . 4 w x w xthat ``E s x g 0, 1 : A x l P x / B s 1r2, 1 '' is closed in 0, 1 . But
 .  . w x .A 1r2 l P 1r2 / B, i.e., the generalized game G s 0, 1 , A, P has no
 .  .equilibrium point since A 1r2 l P 1r2 / B.
By Theorem 4.5, we can also obtain the following well-known
Fan]Glicksberg fixed point theorem:
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COROLLARY 4.6. Let X be a con¨ex compact subset of a locally con¨ex
topological ¨ector space E and A: X ª 2 X be upper semicontinuous with
non-empty closed and con¨ex ¨alues for each x g X. Then A has a fixed point.
 4  .Proof. By I s 1 , and P x s B for each x g X in Theorem 4.5, theni
the conclusion follows.
Remark 4.7. So far, we have proved the existence theorems of equilib-
ria for generalized games with compact and infinite dimensional strategy
spaces, an infinite numbers of agents, and nontotal-nontransitive con-
straint and preference correspondences which may not have open graphs
 .or open lower upper sections. Since it is well known that if a correspon-
dence has an open graph, then it has open upper and lower sections and
thus the correspondences with open lower sections are lower semicontinu-
ous. However, a continuous correspondence does not hold open lower or
.  wupper sections properties in general e.g., see Yannelis and Prabhakar 36,
x.p. 237 . Our results generalize many results in the existing literature by
 .relaxing the openness of graphs or lower upper sections of constraint
 .correspondences. For example, Theorem 3.4 and hence also Corollary 3.5
w xgeneralizes Corollary 3 of Borglin and Keiding 3, p. 315 , Theorem 4.1 of
w x w xChang 6, p. 247 , Theorem of Shafer and Sonnenschein 26, p. 374 , and
w x Theorem 5 of Tulcea 33, p. 10 . Corollary 3.5 and hence our Theorem
. w x3.4 also improves Theorem 6.1 of Yannelis and Prabhakar 36 in the
 .  .following ways: i the index I need not be countable, ii for each i g I,
 .the set X need not metrizable, and iii for each i g I, A l P need noti i i
be L-majorized.
 .By Remark 4.7, Theorem 4.3 also Corollary 4.4 not only shows that
w xTheorem 6.1 of Yannelis and Prabhakar 36, p. 242 can be extended to
non-metrizable subsets without introducing additional assumption and
hence the question raised by Yannelis and Prabhakar is answered in the
affirmative. In fact, some of the assumptions of their question can be
further weakened.
Since we also know that in the infinite settings, the set of feasible
allocations generally is not compact in any topology of the commodity
spaces. It is necessary to consider the existence of equilibria for general-
ized games in which the strategy spaces which may not be compact. This is
done by strengthening the assumptions on the preference or constraint
correspondences which enables one to remove altogether the compactness
 .or paracompactness assumptions on the strategy spaces in the following
section.
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5. EXISTENCE OF EQUILIBRIA FOR N-PERSON GAMES
In this section, we will consider the existence theorems of equilibria for
generalized games in which the strategy spaces are not compact.
First we will present the existence theorem of equiibria for a non-
compact one-person game.
THEOREM 5.1. Let X be a non-empty closed con¨ex subset of a locally
con¨ex topological ¨ector space E. Let A, B, P: X ª 2 X be such that A l P
is L -majorized andC
 . X  .  . y1 .i A: X ª 2 is such that co A x ; B x and A y is compactly
open in X ;
 . Eii the mapping A is C-condensing, where C: 2 ª C is a measure of
 .  .noncompactness. Then exists a point x g X such that x g B x and A x l
 .P x s B.
  .4Proof. Let F s x g X : x g B x . Then F is closed in X. Define c :
X ª 2 X by
A x l P x , if x g F , .  .
c x s .  A x , if x f F . .
If x f F, then X _ F is an open neighborhood of x such that for each
X .  .  .z g X _ F such that z f B z . Now define f : X ª 2 by f z s A zx x
for each z g X and N s X _ F, then N is an open neighborhood of x inx x
X such that
 .  .  .  .i c z ; f z and z f co f z for each z g N , andx x x
 . y1 . y1 .ii f y s A y is compactly open in X.x
 .  .Therefore f is an L -majorant of c at x. If x g F and c x s A xx C
 .l P x / B and A l P is L -majorized, there exist an open neighbor-C
X  .hood N of x in X and a correspondence f : X ª 2 such that c z sx x
 .  .  .  . y1 .A z l P z ; f z and z f co f z for each z g N , and co f y isx x x x
compactly open in X for each y g X. Define the mapping fX : X ª 2 X byx
A z l f z , if z g F , .  .xXf z s .x  A z , if z f F . .
 . .  .  .  .Note that as A l P z ; f z and A z ; A z for each z g N , wex x
 . X  . X  .have c z ; f z . It is easy to see that z f co f z for all z g X.x x
 X .y1 . w y1 .  .xMoreover, for any y g X, the set f y s F y j X _ F lx x
y1 .A y is compactly open in X.
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Therefore FX is an L -majorant of c at point x, and c is an L -x C C
 .majorized correspondence. By condition ii , f is also C-condensing since
 .  .for each x g X, f x ; A x , and A is C-condensing. Hence f satisfies
all hypotheses of Theorem 3.4. By Theorem 3.4, there exists a point x g X
 .  .such that f x s B. Since for each x g X, A x / B, we must have that
 .  .  .x g B x and A x l P x s B.
Let I be a finite set and X a Hausdorff topological space, andi
X s  X . For a given correspondence A : X ª 2 X i, we define aig I i i
X X X  .   .4  y1  ...mapping A : X ª 2 be A x s y g X : y g A x s p A x fori i i i i i
each x g X, where p : X ª X is the ith projection. Then it is easy to seei i
X  .that A is of class L if and only if for each x g X, x f A x andi C i i
y1 .A y is compactly open for each y g X. Now by Theorem 5.1, we shalli
give an existence theorem of equilibrium points for N-person games.
 .THEOREM 5.2. Let X , A , B ; P be an N-person game where I is ai i i i ig I
finite set such that for each i g I,
 .i X is a non-empty closed con¨ex subset of a Hausdorff locallyi
con¨ex topological ¨ector space E ;i
 .  .  .  .ii for each x g X, A x is non-empty and co A x ; B x ;i i i
 . y1 .iii for each y g X , A y is compactly open in X ;i i i
 . X X Xiv the correspondence A l P : X ª 2 is of class L ; andi i C
 . X  .  .v the mapping A: X ª 2 defined by A x s  A x for eachig I i
x g X is C-condensing.
Then there exist a non-empty compact con¨ex subset K ; X and a point x g K
 .  .  .  .such that x g cl B x ; cl B x and A x l P x s B.K i X i i
 .   .  . 4Proof. For each x g X, let I x s i g I: A x l P x / B . Wei i
X  .  .also define the correspondences A, B, P: X ª 2 by A x s  A x ,ig I i
 .  .B x s  B x , andig I i
¡ Xp x , if I x / B, .  .F i~  .igI xP x s . ¢B, if I x s B .
 .  .  .for each x g X. By ii , for each x g X, A x is non-empty and co A x ;
 .  . y1 . y1 .B x . The condition iii implies that A y s F A y is compactlyig I i
open in X. In order to apply Theorem 5.1, it is sufficient to prove that the
correspondence A l P: X ª 2 X is of L -majorized.C
 . .   .  ..Let x g X with A l P x / B, i.e.,  A x l P x / B andig I x . i i
 .I x / B. We now show that there exists a compactly open neighborhood
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 .  .  .N of x in X such that I x ; I z for all z g N . Indeed, for i g I x ,x x
X  . X . X  . X .  Xsince A x l P x / B, taking any y g A x l P x , then x g A li i i i i
X.y1 .  X X.y1 .  X X.y1 .P y . Let N s A l P y and N s F A l P y , theni i i i x ig I x . i i
 .  .N is compactly open in X by iv and I x is finite. Now if z g N , thenx x
 .  X X. .  X X. .for each i g I x , z g N s A l P y so that y g A l P z / B.i i i i i
 .  .  .Thus i g I z . This shows that I x ; I z for all z g N . Now fix anyx
 .i g I x . For any z g N , we have0 x
A l P z ; AX z l PX z .  .  .  .F i i
 .igI z
; AX z l PX z since I x ; I z .  .  .  . .F i i
 .igI x
; AX l PX z . . .i i0 0
Note that A: X ª 2 X is C-condensing with non-empty values, there exists
a non-empty compact convex subset K of X such that A is self mapping
K  .by Lemma 2.1. Thus A l P: K ª 2 is also self-mapping since A x l
 .  .P x ; A x for each x g K.
Without loss of generality, we may assume x g K. Since K is regular
and N is a compactly open neighborhood of x in X, there exists an openx
neighborhood M of x in K such that M ; cl M ; N l K. We nowx x K x x
define a mapping c : K ª 2 K byx
X XA l P z l K , if z g cl M , . .i i K x0 0c z s .x  K , if z f cl M .K x
 . .  .Then it is easy to see that A l P z ; c z for each z g K. And forx
 .  .each z g M , z f co c z by assumption v . For any y g K,x x
cy1 y s z g K : y g c z 4 .  .x x
s z g cl M : y g c z j z g K _ cl M : y g c z 4  4 .  .K x x K x x
X Xs z g cl M : y g A l P z l K j K _ cl M .  . . 5K x i i K x0 0
X Xs cl M l A l P y l K j K _ cl M .  . . 5K x i i K x0 0
y1X Xs K l A l P y j K _ cl M .  . . 5i i K x0 0
 .is open in K by iv . Therefore c is L-majorized of A l P at x inx
 . .  .space K, since A l P x ; A x for each x g K, so that A l P is
 .L -majorized note that M is the desired open neighborhood of x in KC x
in K.
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 . K  .Now we consider the mapping A l P : K ª 2 , then A l PK K
satisfies all hypotheses of Theorem 5.1. By Theorem 5.1, there exists a
 .  .  .point x g K such that x g cl B x and A x l P x s B. Hence forK
 .  .  .each i g I, x g cl B x ; cl B x . We now also claim that I x s B.i K i X i
 .  .  .Suppose it were not true, since A x l P x s B. There exists i g I x0
 .  .  .such that A x l P x s B which contradicts the definition I x .i i0 0
 .  .  .Therefore we have I x s B, i.e., A x l P x s B for all i g I.i i
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